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Review Article: Justice without Measure 
Alain Supiot Governance by Numbers: The Making of a Legal Model of Allegiance. Hart Studies in 
Comparative Public Law. Translated by Saskia Brown. Bloomsbury Publishing (2017), £65. 
 
David Nelken1 
The latest book by the eminent French scholar Alain Supiot2 is a highly readable if intellectually 
challenging effort to pin down the effects on law of the move to 'governance through numbers'. It 
also seeks to describe and warn of the inadequacies of the 'legal model of allegiance' that he argues  
accompanies or follows this move. Ably translated by Saskia Brown from the French La 
gouvernance par les nombres3, it builds on Supiot's previous work, especially Homo Juriducus4, and 
draws on and contributes to a wide variety of literatures. With much of its argument focused on 
what has happened to employment relations, the book has been praised as an important contribution 
to labour law5, (something to be expected given his eminence in this field). It has also been hailed 
as a 'tour de force' by constitutional lawyers (and appears in a series dedicated to comparative 
public law).6 As its title suggests, however, those interested in legal and social theory will also want 
to consider its relevance for understanding the changing role of law at a time of increasing resort to 
forms of coordination and regulation that rely on quantification and artificial intelligence.  
The book offers the following helpful guide to its argument on its cover page: 'The West's cherished 
dream of social harmony by numbers is today disrupting all our familiar legal frameworks - the 
state, democracy and law itself. Its scientistic vision shaped both Taylorism and Soviet Planning, 
and today, with 'globalisation', it is flourishing in the form of governance by numbers. Shunning the 
goal of governing by just laws, and empowered by the information and communication 
 
1Dickson Poon Law School, King's College London 
2 Supiot is a fellow of the Collège de France elected to a chair called «État social et mondialisation : 
analyse juridique des solidarités» he is also a corresponding member of the British Academy. 
3 Paris, Fayard, coll. « Poids et mesures du monde », 2015.  
4 See the review by P. Goodrich, 'Law's labour's lost' 72  Modern Law Review  (2009), pp. 296-312.  
5 Z. Adams, 46 Industrial Law Journal  (2017), pp. 163–168 (reviewing the original monograph in 
French). 
6 See M. Goldoni, 16 International Journal of Constitutional Law (2018) pp. 1041–1043.  
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technologies, governance champions a new normative ideal of attaining measurable objectives. 
Programmes supplant legislation, and governance displaces government. However, management by 
objectives revives forms of law typical of economic vassalage. When a person is no longer 
protected by a law applying equally to all, the only solution is to pledge allegiance to someone 
stronger than oneself. Rule by law had already secured the principle of impersonal power, but in 
taking this principle to extremes, governance by numbers has paradoxically spawned a world ruled 
by ties of allegiance.' 7 
But this summary does not fully capture the book's variety of rich and complex discussions. The 
early chapters, for example, report on a wide ranging investigation of how our modern idea of law 
emerged in the West and the forms it has taken in different cultures. He goes on to claim that the 
introduction of Taylorism as a scientific way of organizing work in the factory reflects instead an 
attempt to produce social order though  'harmony through numbers'.  The book's key chapters then 
discuss how law has been 'dethroned' 8 by what he calls the  'normative uses of quantification', and 
the way this has infiltrated the tasks of accounting managing, judging and legislating. Supiot 
illustrates the false objectivity provided by numbers in the way accounting practices in reality 
privilege the investors' viewpoint, discusses the implications of the invention of the category of the 
'normal man' and management by objectives, and points to the fallacy of trying to reduce judging to 
calculations of probability. He tells us that the industrial 'social imaginary'  has been replaced by the 
cybernetic one, in which rule is no longer conceived as a heteronomous obligation but is instead 
homeostatic and auto-referential, so that  'people are no longer expected to act freely within the 
limits laid down by law, but to react in real time to the multiple signals they receive in order to meet 
those targets they are assigned'.9 For Supiot, government by numbers undermine the rule of law, 
which provides the bridge we need between the world of sense and the world of the senses; it is the 
last bastion of defence against the dehumanizing inroads of science and technology. 
In the last section of his book Supiot puts forward the most controversial part of his thesis, 
interpreting recent decisions of the French, EU and international courts  so as to show that we are 
moving to a new legal model of allegiance. For him, world society is undergoing a form of 
refeudalisation characterised by 'networks of allegiance...' where 'each person depends on the 
protection of those stronger than he and on the dedication of those weaker.10 Thus employers are 
 
7 Cover blurb of Alain  Supiot Governance by Numbers. 
8 id. p.103 ff. 
9  id.. p10 . 
10 id. p.285.   
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made responsible for the bad health effects of their workplace routines on workers, multinationals 
are expected to police the harms caused by sub- contractors in their supply chains, the EU imposes 
ever stronger requirements on its member nation -states whilst smaller states are pressed into 
coalitions of the willing by imperial nation- states such as the USA. 11  
It is tricky, however, to work out the relationship between 'government by numbers' and the new 
model of allegiance. On one reading, government by numbers itself entails the rise of this model of 
allegiance, which have accompanied the implanting of governance by numbers. Adams parses this 
as 'the creation of a different type of social bond which generates legal orders more similar to a 
medieval type. Constitutional fragments are generated and dispersed across a society that looks 
more and more like a series of “fiefdoms” organized in a series of distinctive networks of relations 
of allegiance...The concept of ‘refeudalisation’ is a particularly apt characterisation of 
neoliberalism’s attempt to decentralise and privatise the exercise of power. The employment 
contract 'no longer effects an exchange, but merely ‘organises the exercise of power’. Herein lies 
the comparison with feudal vassalage: the worker today offers for ‘exchange’ not just his labour 
power, but all the faculties of his person. These relationships subject individuals to ‘objective’ 
evaluation criteria, with a view to promoting their obedience without the need for direct control. ' 12 
   On the other hand, on another possible reading, the growth of a new form of allegiance is a 
consequence of the unsustainability of the regime of governance by numbers. 13 It is significant that 
he entitles part two of his book 'From governance by numbers to ties of allegiance'. On this view 
Supiot would be charting two moves, that from the juridical to government by numbers, and from 
that to a new version of patron- vassal relationships. This last comes about as an unintended - even 
paradoxical14 reaction-  either because the numbers approach breaks down or is resisted. The new 
legal model of allegiance thus proves that the attempt to find an impersonal model of governing 
people that does not base itself on the heteronomous demands of law only leads (back) to greater 
dependence.  
On either reading a number of issues remain open. How exactly is governance by numbers related 
to personal  allegiance? Is the point that management by objectives relies on third parties but not the 
 
11 Supiot, op.cit. p.222.ff 
12 Adams op.cit. p.167.  
13 Supiot p.286. 
14 A term Supiot uses. 
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right ones? 15Is the relationship between numbers and allegiance the same everywhere? For better or 
worse, quantification has been introduced in the Italian University system as part of an attempt to 
measure productivity and thus weaken clientelist allegiance.16 How do developments vary by 
different legal contexts?  Consider for example the effects of the growing uses of quantification in 
the field of criminal justice17. Adams tells us that even some developments in labour relations do 
not correspond that well to Supiot's ideas about interdependence. As she notes, '...the job security 
enjoyed by the vassal seems a far cry from the ‘flexibility’ and insecurity inherent in the ‘zero hours 
contract’, for example, where it seems the worker has no choice but to subjugate himself to the 
needs of the employer not in return for security and autonomy, but in return for complete 
dependence, insecurity.' 18 How much have Supiot's points to do with the wider effects of 
globalization. Certainly neo-liberalism has magnified the role of the market at the expense of the 
nation -state; and many of  his examples have mainly to do with the limits of state law once it has to 
grapple with transnational challenges.. 
Even if we put aside his claims about a new legal model of allegiance, however, there is still much 
to learn from what Supiot has to say about the difference between government and governance.  
He offers for instance a useful table comparing the 'political vocabulary' of these two forms of 
rule19. We have moved, he says, from people to civil society; sovereignty to subsidiarity; territory to 
space; law to programme; freedom to flexibility; morals to ethics; justice to efficiency; judgment to 
evaluation; rule versus objective; rulings to regulation; representation to transparency; worker to 
human capital; qualification to employability; trade unions to social partners; and collective 
bargaining to social dialogue. As he sums it immediately after setting out his table, 'Where 
 
15 As Supiot writes (op.cit. p.285), 'when the state no longer assumes its role as guardian of peoples 
identity, and of their physical and economic security, then people will inevitably pledge allegiance 
to any group claiming to provide such guarantees- be it clans, religious factions, ethnic identities or 
mafia networks'.  
16 D. Nelken 'Corruption as Governance? Law, Transparency and Appointment Procedures in 
Italian Universities' in F. von Benda-Beckmann, K. von Benda-Beckmann eds. Rules of Law and 
Laws of Ruling, (2009) 275-295. 
17see e.g. B. Bowling  'Automatic Justice? Technology, Crime, and Social Control', Oxford 
Handbooks on line (2017). 
18 Adams op.cit. p.168. 
19 Supiot op.cit. p. 29-30. 
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government relies on subordinating individuals, governance, in line with its cybernetic vison, relies 
on programming them.' 20 
These concerns about the transformation of law are shared by many other Continental European 
thinkers (who have reservations about aspects of the common law and especially USA based 'law 
and economics'). Garapon and Lassègue, for example, offer an account that shows us some of the 
further analytical possibilities of Supiot's insights (though they also emphasise, even more than 
Supiot, the importance of the move from text and words to numbers and computation, as part of 
what they refer to as the 'graphic revolution')21. Their table entitled 'territorial legal order versus 
global post legal systems' , which is intended to summarise their argument, offers a series of 
contrasts in summarising their argument. They counterpose territorialisation to deterritorialisation; 
political organisations and a mediated world based on territorial exclusivity, as opposed to legal 
pluralism; coordination versus market actor regulation; legally stabilized social relationships versus 
innovation, hierarchy versus the horizontal relationships relying on many sources of law as with 
predictive justice; obeying the law versus negotiation between individuals; ritual versus technique; 
operations in chronological order versus no such order; the physical world versus internet; 
procedure versus design; public level versus third parties, setting up an ideal versus effectiveness; 
exercising a right versus defending an interest; access to justice versus incentives to come to an 
agreement; public service versus platform for paying private enterprises; public authority imposed 
on all - versus recognition of specificity of competence case by case; predictable law versus 
situational and flexible rule; decisions versus solutions; long and complex procedures that tend to 
be used rarely versus easy accessible affordable and immediate mediation; opacity of ritual versus 
complexity of user techniques; disinterested third party versus interested third party; power as 
capacity to reunite forces in a territory versus capacity to mobilize the multitude; intelligibility for 
an overall view versus intelligibility for the actor; representation in symbols versus non figurative 
systems; primacy of public versus private law; cultural concepts versus apocryphal concepts 
reinterpreted by economic or technical approaches; government versus governance; visible power 
couched in juridical terms versus power hidden without juridical form; independence in an territory 
versus independence in (almost) all  territories; the real versus the virtual; local power versus non 
 
20 id. p. 30. 
21 A. Garapon and J.Lassègue, Justice digitale. Révolution graphique et rupture anthropologique 
(2018).  
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localizable power; rooted versus rootless law; and concrete geographical order versus abstract 
systems. '22 
Supiot's book can be taken as another contribution to the growing literature concerned with the 
problems posed by the normative uses of quantification. But he does not offer a systematic account 
of what these problems are. Should we be more worried by reliance on quantitative as opposed to 
qualitative information in policy interventions, the over- reliance on measurement, metrics and 
targets in motivating rule compliance, the way comparisons impose categories as they 
commensurate standards between dissimilar settings, the use of numbers rather than words and 
language in communicating ideals, or the rise of Big Data and the ubiquitous employment of 
algorithms to (help) make decisions- or all of the above? What is also missing in this book (as in 
much of the literature) is an empirical analysis of the way different social actors employ such 
techniques in different processes (with potentially contradictory effects)23. Supiot spends little time 
on telling us who rules through quantification, nor does he say much about the possible differences 
between its use by governments in the global North and South, multinational and national 
businesses and companies, Inter -governmental organisations, non- governmental organisations and 
foundations, experts and epistemic communities; even some newspapers who have made their 
fortune by creating ranking schemes.24 
Is the threat represented by these modalities of governance intrisic to their operations or more about 
the way they displace the domain of law? One important way forward would be to focus on 
similarities and differences between what can be described as more and less counter -factual uses of 
numbers in setting targets and manipulating people.25 As examples of the first counter factual use 
 
22 id. at  p.201-203. (The free translation is mine). In all these contrasts it is implied that the first 
pole of the paired terms is the better one. 
23 Insofar as Supiot argues that the rise of a new model of interpersonal allegiance is a 'legal' one it 
would also be important to see how it relies on these other ways of producing conformity. 
24 But he does seem to approve the work of the International Labour Organisation, for whom he has 
acted as a consultant, even if they also sometimes use quantification for normative purposes. 
25 See D. Nelken 'The Legitimacy of Global Social Indicators: Reconfiguring Authority, 
Accountability and Accuracy', 59 Les Cahiers de Droit (2018) 35-84. Global indicators and 
algorithms can be placed on a continuum of forms of normative regulation that runs from ethics at 
one extreme to designing out rule- breaking at the other (see Figure 1 p.44). 
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we could take (global) social indicators26- an aspect of audit culture27, and, to illustrate the second, 
regulation by algorithms28- a feature of what has been called algocracy29. There are, admittedly, 
many similarities, in the problems that have been attributed to indicators and algorithms. In their 
efforts to predicting risks and justify decisions both can be partial and misleading, can mistake  the 
map for the territory- and too easily assume that only what can be measured is of value. Both can be 
self- fulfilling, creating what they claim to be measuring. And both can hide rather than eliminate 
discretion and bias. 
       On the other hand, there are also important contrasts ways in the way each of these seek to 
shape conduct. The global social indicators30, that rank matters such as levels of corruption or 
standards of corporate responsibility, have to do this in a way that they can be understood both by 
those whose behaviour is being ranked and by those relying on such information in making their 
decisions. Publicity is also essential to the role they often play in naming and shaming. As with law, 
 
26 A global social indicator has been defined as  'a named collection of rank-ordered data that 
purports to represent the past or projected performance of different units. The data are generated 
through a process that simplifies raw data about a complex social phenomenon. The data, in this 
simplified and processed form, are capable of being used to compare particular units of analysis 
(such as countries or institutions or corporations), synchronically or over time, and to evaluate their 
performance by reference to one or more standards’ K. Davis, B. Kingsbury and S. Merry 
Governance by Indicators. Global Power through Quantification and Rankings (2012), p.6. 
27 see eg. C. Shore and S. Wright 'Governing by Numbers: Audit Culture, Rankings and the New 
World Order'  23 Social Anthropology, (2015), pp. 22-28.  
28 'Algorithmic regulation 'refers to decision making systems that regulate a domain of activity in 
order to manage risk or alter behavior through continual computational generation of knowledge by 
systematically collecting data (in real time on a continuous basis) emitted directly from numerous 
dynamic components pertaining to the regulated environment in order to identify and, if necessary, 
automatically refine (or prompt refinement of) the system's operations to attain a pre‐specified goal.' 
K. Yeung 'Algorithmic Regulation: A Critical Interrogation', 12 Regulation and Governance (2018) 
pp. 505-523 at p.507. 
29 see e.g.  https://algocracy.wordpress.com/1-logical-space-of-algocracy, accessed 2/6/2019. 
30 See e.g. K. E. Davis et. al.(2012)  note 24; S. Merry, K.E Davis, B. Kingsbury, eds. The Quiet 
Power of Indicators (2015);  R. Rottenburg, S. Merry, S. J. Park, and J. Mugler eds. The World of 
Indicators: The Making of Government Knowledge through Quantification (2015); D. V. Malito, G. 
Umbach, N. Bhuta eds. The Palgrave Handbook of Global Indicators (2017). 
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the criteria they use can be subjected to contestation and even violation of these standards can 
produce useful information. With algorithms,31 on the other hand, it is counter-productive to allow 
for violation, and algorithmic regulation typically requires those whose choices are being shaped to 
be unaware of what is influencing them. Demands for more openness may also be blocked by 
claims of property rights. Moreover, especially when machine learning takes over, how they work 
may even not be understood by those using them; they produce the 'black box society'32. Whilst 
indicators may often fail in their goals (Supiot is not the first to point to the many perverse effects 
of governance by numbers), algorithms may be all too successful. Perhaps Supiot does not need to 
address these differences because his focus is on targets for workers; these indicators of 
performance may be comparable in effect to algorithms inasmuch as they are so often given little 
opportunity to shape them. But in other cases these differences will matter. 
Only by learning more about the workings of these modes of governance (both their successes and 
failures) will we be able to decide whether the answer lies in make them more acceptable, or 
whether, on the contrary, we should try to make them less credible. This can be seen if we consider 
the current proposals that are being suggested as ways to stop them encroaching on the rule of law. 
We could require indicators or algorithms to be formulated and applied in ways that conform better 
to the principles of legality. We could improve procedures, and build in more opportunities for 
participation and contestation by those being evaluated. We could also try to promote reflection by 
the communities affected, though some means of closure would also be required to prevent 
discussion becoming interminable. Injecting legality in this way would have the goal of increasing 
the legitimacy of these forms of ordering. Alternatively, we could try to use law as a means to 
regulate the extent to which these forms of social ordering can be used - using data protection and 
other requirements to stunt their growth. 33 This approach would underline the lack of legitimacy of 
these forms of ordering so as to circumscribe their ambit. 
 
31 see e.g. M. Hildebrandt, Smart Technologies and the End(s) of Law (2015); C. O' Neil Weapons 
of Maths Destruction (2016); E. Finn ed. What do algorithms want? (2017); E. Bayamlioglu, I. 
Baraliuc, L. Janssens and M. Hildebrandt Being profiled (2018); P. de Filippi and A.Wright 
Blockchain and the law (2019). 
32 F. Pasquale The Black Box Society (2015). 
33 see e.g. M. Hildebrandt op. cit. note 30; R. Brownsword 'From Erewhon to AlphaGo: for the sake 
of human dignity, should we destroy the machines? 9 Law, innovation and technology (2017). R. 
Brownsword,  'Law Disrupted, Law Re-Imagined, Law re-invented', Technology and Regulation 
pp.10-30. 
 9 
The problem with many proposed solutions is that these new methods of governance are often 
adopted precisely because of the advantages they are seen to offer as compared to relying just on 
law for regulation and prediction. The information generated by indicators can contribute to more 
evidence- based decision making. Algorithmic regulation can offer a more speedy and effective 
route to bringing about desired outcomes. The very advantages for which they are employed can be 
undone by making them more law- like. The growth of these forms of shaping behaviour itself is 
changing older ways of understanding the meaning of choice and consent. Supiot tells us repeatedly 
in his book that being governed by targets can drive people mad. But in practice not only may 
managers be enticed by the 'seductions of quantification'34, even those being managed can be 
trapped by their own own desires.35 
 
 
 
34 S. Merry The seductions of quantification (2016). 
35 B. E. Harcourt Exposed: desire and disobedience in the digital age (2015). 
